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| No. 930367-CA 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to § 78-2-2(3)(1) Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Were the findings of the trial court clearly erroneous? 
2. Were the conclusions of the trial court correct? 
3. Does the overlapping of a mineral filing claim upon 
federal lands constitute slander of title to the overlapped 
claim? 
4. Does a quiet title action provide any remedies or award 
of damages for failure to timely release an alleged cloud on the 
title? 
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5. Is the appellee entitled to attorneys fees for frivolous 
appeal under Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure? 
6. The remaining issues are stated by the appellant. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. To successfully challenge the trial court's findings the 
appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
Ohline Corp. v. Granite Mill, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 79 (March 1993). 
2. The appellate court reviews a trial court's conclusions 
of law for correction of error. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
(a) Utah Code Annotated § 78-40-1 to § 78-40-13 relative to 
quieting title. 
(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33. 
(c) Utah Code Annotated § 40-1-2 relative to filing notice 
of location of placer claims on federal lands. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff-Appellant ("Fullers") commenced the action to 
quiet title to a portion of their mineral claims and mill site 
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and for damages for slander of title. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court. 
After a full bench trial and review of briefs filed by both 
parties the trial court issued a memorandum decision together 
with subsequent Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
dismissing the Fullers' complaint with prejudice with each party 
bearing its own costs. 
C. Statement of Facts 
Appellees submit the following excerpt from the trial 
court's Findings of Fact as being the facts of the case: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to September 14, 1991, Fullers were owners of 
mining claims in Park Valley, Box Elder County, Utah, known as 
Turquoise Stone Placer Mining Claim and Turquoise State Placer 
Millsite Claim. The defendants ("Bowns11) on or about April 2, 
1990 filed a Notice of Location of a placer claim designated as 
Boulder Haven #1 described as all of the West one half (1/2) of 
the Northeast one fourth (1/4) of Section 18, Township 13 North, 
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base & Meridian, an eighty (80) acre 
claim which overlapped a portion of about five acres of the 
Turquoise Stone Placer Millsite of the plaintiff in said quarter 
section. The defendant, William Bown, had previously observed a 
plat on file with the Bureau of Land Management which did not 
clearly show any of the Fullers7 mill site to be within the 
eighty (80) acre filing of the Bowns's. Bowns did not knowingly, 
recklessly, maliciously, deliberately file the overlapping placer 
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claim with intention to slander the title of the Fullers' mill 
site claim. Bowns at no time took possession of the mill site 
area or interfered with the use thereof. 
2. Bowns on May 18, 1992, filed a release with the Bureau 
of Land Management of the Boulder Haven #1 placer claim, and on 
August 10, 1992, delivered to Fullers an Abandonment And 
Disclaimer of the said placer claim for recording in the office 
of the Recorder of Box Elder County, Utah. 
3. The Fullers suffered no damages as a result of the 
overlapping filing by the Bowns. 
4. No attorneys fees were paid or incurred by the Fullers 
in connection with this proceeding, in that Glen E. Fuller 
appeared and acted pro se. 
Fullers' Statement of Facts includes some of the evidence 
presented, however the Fullers have not undertaken their burden 
of marshalling all the evidence to render the findings of the 
trial court clearly erroneous. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The findings of the trial court must stand in absence of 
marshalling of evidence which would show them to be clearly 
erroneous. The overlapping of the placer claim does not 
constitute a cloud upon the title nor did it constitute slander 
of title. A quiet title action does not include the right of the 
Fullers to demand damages or attorney fees. The Bowns disclaimed 
any interest in the overlap and the Fullers suffered no damages 
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therefrom. Having insisted on pursuing the litigation after 
disclaimer and demanding attorney fees where none is provided by 
law, the Fullers pursued a frivolous claim below as well as 
herein, and the Bowns should be entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. FULLERS SUSTAINED NO RECOVERABLE DAMAGES. 
Fullers sustained no recoverable damages. Fullers sold the 
claim prior to litigation at a substantial profit and they and 
their buyer profited by intimidating the Bowns to release the 
Bowns7 entire eighty (80) acre claim to eliminate only a five 
acre overlap. The buyer immediately filed a claim on the entire 
eighty (80) acre tract vacated by the Bowns, thus receiving a 
seventy-five (75) acre windfall. 
Fullers are not entitled to damages in a suit to quiet 
title. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in Jack B. Parson 
Companies v. Nieldr 751 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Utah 1988): 
The trial court awarded damages against Nield for 
refusing to "cleanse" title. The damages were based 
upon the amount of interest Parson paid on its loan 
from Bank of Utah while the title was held up. There 
is no basis in law for this award. Quiet title actions 
are statutory in nature, Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 
11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958), and Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-40-1 
through -13 (1987), authorizing quiet title actions, 
does not include any remedies for refusing to release 
title. Although Utah Code Ann. § 57-3-8 (1986) allows 
damages when a mortgagee fails to discharge or release 
a mortgage after it has been fully satisfied, Utah case 
law renders that statute inapplicable to this factual 
situation. 
Both the applicability of section 57-3-8 and the 
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availability of damages for a refusal to "cleanse" 
title are controlled by the holding in Draper v. J.B. & 
R.E. Walker, Inc.P 115 Utah 368, 204 P.2d 826 (1949). 
In Draper, the plaintiff was the owner of two tracts of 
land that adjoined land owned by Old Mill Tavern, Inc. 
After recording tax deeds to the plaintiff's property, 
Old Mill Tavern commenced an action to quiet title to 
the land. Before a decree was entered quieting title, 
the owner of the tavern delivered a mortgage to 
defendant Walker; the mortgage was filed thirteen 
months before the district court held the tax deeds 
invalid and quieted the title. The plaintiff requested 
that the defendant release the mortgage once the decree 
had been entered. When the defendant did not do so, 
the plaintiff sued for damages. This Court held that 
there was no affirmative duty to release the lien and 
that "at the common law, no action for damages would 
lie because of a refusal to release a mortgage or 
discharge a lien or claim against property." Id. at 
374, 204 P.2d at 829. Nor did section 57-3-8 (then 
section 78-3-8) apply. The Court stated, "[The] scope 
of the statute is clearly limited to the mortgagee-
mortgagor relationship. . . . [T]he demand that the 
release be executed was made by one who was not a 
mortgagor upon one who had never occupied the position 
of mortgagee to this plaintiff or any one [sic] in 
privity with him." Id. at 375, 204 P.2d at 830. 
POINT II. THIS CASE DID NOT INVOLVE FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTED 
SLANDER OF TITLE NOR ANY CLOUD UPON THE TITLE OF FULLERS. 
Fullers contend that junior filings of placer mining claims 
on federal lands constitute slander of title to a senior placer 
mining claim. The filing of a Notice of Location of a placer 
claim on federal land is provided in Utah Code Annotated § 40-1-
2, and only requires a statement of the name of the claim, names 
of locators, date of location, number of acres and "such a 
description of the claim or mill site, located by reference to 
some natural object or permanent monument, as will identify the 
claim or mill site." As stated in Crawford v. Gibbs 123 Utah 
447, 260 P.2d 870, 871 (Utah 1953): 
Prospectors are not engineers nor does the law expect 
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them to be. However, the law does require sufficient 
detail and accuracy in the notice as recorded to allow 
location of the claim upon reasonable effort. 
The Crawford case involved typical conflicting claims arising in 
the excitement to discover uranium ore. No one claimed slander 
of title. Nor have we found any cases which hold that a junior 
filing constitutes slander of title to a senior notice of 
location of a placer mining claim or mill site. In fact, in such 
instances it is even anticipated that there will be senior and 
junior locations. In 54 Am Jur 2d 259, Mines and Minerals 
Section 76, it is stated: 
In other words, a relocation of land that at the time 
is covered by a valid and subsisting location is wholly 
void, not only as against the prior locator, but also 
as against all the world; and neither succeeding 
default by the original appropriator nor subsequent 
discovery by the junior claimant can make it valid. 
The section continues: 
The principle stated does not conflict with the right 
of a junior claimant to extend the boundaries of his 
claim over, upon, or across a senior location, since 
the benefits obtained thereby are in no way 
inconsistent with those of the first locator. 
Mr. Fuller filed a map with the BLM which did not show a place 
claim in the Northeast quarter of Section 18, although he 
subsequently filed a mill site claim for 5 acres in the Northeast 
quarter which recites: "This millsite placer claim does not 
include any land which is mineral in character. . . . " 
Therefore, the Bown location for placer minerals would not 
conflict with a mill site claim unless Bown interfered with 
possession of the mill site — which did not occur. 
Accordingly, the filing by Bown of a notice of location of 
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placer claim in no way constitutes a claim of ownership of any 
previous filings of Fuller for a mill site. Bown has never 
claimed any conflicting interest in Fuller's claims, and in fact, 
William Bown was well acquainted with the principal person, Gary 
Mullard in Northern Stone Supply, Inc., and suggested that 
Mullard (not previously known to Fuller) contact Fuller to buy 
the subject claims. Mullard did contract to buy Fuller's claims 
by agreement dated September 14, 1991. Fuller benefited and 
profited by Bown's recommendations and was not damaged by any 
action of the defendants. It is not as though the defendants 
expressed in any way, by notices or otherwise, that they claimed 
Fuller's mill site. Fullers quoted only a part of Bown's 
testimony and excluded the part which removed the implications 
created by Fullers' underlining and editing portions of Bown's 
testimony to give the reverse impression from that which was 
apparent to the trial court. 
OTHER UTAH CASES ON DESCRIPTIONS 
An interesting case on the leniency afforded mineral 
locators in their descriptions of claims is one in which Glen E. 
Fuller was a plaintiff in Fuller v. Mountain Sculpture 6 Utah 2d 
385, 314 P.2d 840 (Utah 1957). It appears to involve property in 
the vicinity of the subject controversy. The Utah Supreme Court 
was liberal in stating that Glen Fuller's procedure did not 
include a survey but relied on his own sense of direction laying 
out the claim partly by guesswork and in some instances by 
stepping distances which the Court said was "a not unusual 
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practice in locating mining claims." The opinion makes many 
references to the latitude allowed in descriptions such as 
references to "a cedar tree", "a stone with a stick and a red 
flag on it", "a large white rock with a cedar tree by it," etc. 
The Court said that punctilious compliance is not an 
indispensable prerequisite and that "the statutory rules are 
subject to variance to meet practical exigencies confronted by 
prospectors." 
The Fuller case was cited for similar reasons in Powell v. 
Atlas Corp. 615 P.2d 1225 (Utah 1980). 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 40-1-4, within thirty (30) days 
of the posting of notice upon the claim itself, the locator is to 
file for record in the office of the county recorder, a 
substantial copy of the notice of location. However, such notice 
of location "shall not be abstracted unless a subsequent 
conveyance affecting the same property is filed for record, 
whereupon it shall be abstracted." There was no evidence that 
either the Bown notice or the Fuller notice were ever abstracted 
by the Box Elder County Recorder and the evidence was that such 
notices were merely filed by the recorder and no plats or 
abstracts were made. 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW ON SLANDER OF TITLE 
Section 623A of the Restatement of the Law of Torts Second 
lists the elements for liability in the publication of injurious 
falsehoods and Section 624 applies these elements to slander of 
title to property. 
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§ 623A. Liability for Publication of Injurious 
Falsehood— General Principle 
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the 
interests of another is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss resulting to the other if 
(a) he intends for publication of the statement to 
result in harm to interests of the other having a 
pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should 
recognize that it is likely to do so, and 
(b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in 
reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. 
§ 624. Disparagement of Property—Slander of Title 
The rules on liability for the publication of an 
injurious falsehood stated in § 623A apply to the 
publication of a false statement disparaging another7s 
property rights in land, chattels or intangible things, 
that publisher should recognize as likely to result in 
pecuniary harm to the other through the conduct of 
third persons in respect to the other's interest in the 
property. 
Comment: 
a. This Section is a special application of the 
general principle as to the publication of an injurious 
falsehood stated in § 623A, to which reference should 
be made. The Comments to that Section are all 
applicable here, so far as they are pertinent. 
There was no evidence that the notice filed by Bown was 
harmful to Fullers7 claim nor that Bowns filed their notice 
intending harm. The court found that Bowns "did not knowingly, 
recklessly, maliciously, deliberately file the overlapping placer 
claim." Bowns7 notice was a rectangular eighty (80) acre tract 
described as the west one-half of the northeast quarter of a 
section and it happened to overlap five acres of Fullers7 mill 
site claim which projected triangularly into that eighty (80) 
acre filing. In the filing of mineral claims the formalities of 
an exact survey are not expected as was stated by the Court in 
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Crawford v. Gibbsf supra. 
POINT III. FULLERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES. 
The cases cited by Fuller allowing attorney fees for 
quieting title are not relevant to the facts of this case, and if 
relevant, an attorney acting pro se is not entitled to attorney 
fees. The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Smith v. Batchelor 
832 P.2d 467 (Utah 1992) held that an attorney representing 
himself pro so is not entitled to recover attorney fees even 
where attorney fees would otherwise be proper. 
Olsen v. Kidman, 235 P.2d 510 (Utah 1951) involved a filing 
of a Notice of Lien by Kidman, a realtor, for a claimed 
commission where no statutory provision for such lien existed. 
Kidman actually claimed that he had a valid, equitable lien upon 
plaintiff's real property. The opinion upheld the award of 
attorney fees stating: "The court found that it was necessary 
for the plaintiff to employ counsel for the purpose of removing 
the lien. . . . " Fullers did not employ counsel to pursue the 
instant litigation. 
In Dowse v. Doris Trust Co., 208 P.2d 956 (Utah 1949), the 
defendant, Doris, recorded a document claiming that Dowse had 
purchased a designated tract as agent for Doris, and thus 
prevented Dowse from selling the tract. The opinion states: 
"Defendant 
did not deny that he placed the instrument on record knowing that 
he did not have an enforceable contract to buy the land for the 
purpose of preventing plaintiff from mortgaging or selling it." 
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The Bown trial court properly found that Bowns had not 
slandered the title to Fullers' claims. Accordingly, there was 
no basis for an award of attorney fees because in absence of 
statute, contract, or rule of law providing for attorney fees, 
none should be awarded. Ouin v. Ouinf 830 P.2d 282, 284 (Utah 
App. 1992). 
Assuming that attorney fees were otherwise indicated in this 
case, the holding of Smith v. Batchelor is the law of the case in 
denying a pro se attorney from recovering fees. Nor does 
Fullers' claim to attorney fees qualify as "costs." As stated in 
Tholen v. Sandy City. 208 Adv. Rep. 75, 77 (Utah App. 1993), "In 
Utah attorney's fees are awardable only if authorized by statute 
or contract. . . . Moreover, attorney's fees should not be 
confused with the more generic term "costs" because without 
specific statutory language, costs do not include attorney's 
fees." 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of dismissal of the action with prejudice 
should be affirmed and the respondent should be awarded attorney 
fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
'George K. Fadel 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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I mailed two copies of Brief of Defendants-Appellees to Glen 
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